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Invisible atmospheric knowledges in British insurance companies, 1830-1914 
 
1. Introduction 
 
If insurance is considered to mean any attempt to guard against the consequences of disaster or loss, 
then it has a very long history. Its principle of pooling resources in a collectivity – a local benevolent 
society, an international insurance company, or a nation state – against future possible disaster 
represents a way of coping with uncertainty and is a key part of what we think of as government or 
civil society. Recognisable insurance contracts date from the fifteenth century, and life, fire and 
shipping insurance all become established in Britain in the late seventeenth century, though life 
assurance really only came into its own in the last decades of the eighteenth century and would 
undergo great changes and expansion in the nineteenth.1 Modern insurance, however, is thought to 
be characterised by its use of actuarial calculation, which came about after the ‘probabilistic 
                                            
1 Geoffrey Wilson Clark, Betting on Lives: The Culture of Life Insurance in England, 1695-1775 (Manchester University Press, 
1999). 
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revolution’ of the seventeenth century. In the case of life assurance, for example, in the late 
eighteenth century the Equitable’s actuary calculated premium tables that were based upon earlier 
statistical investigations of mortality. A better sense of ‘normal’ life expectancy should mean that 
firms could ensure that the premiums received from policyholders would cover likely costs from 
death claims. The use of more accurate estimates of mortality and the professionalization of actuarial 
science in the nineteenth century meant that firms became more secure, and life policies became 
increasingly viewed as a form of protection against the future.2 
 
However, while actuarial calculations converted uncertainty into priceable risk, the history of 
insurance shows that they were not adopted until later than is often assumed. Geoffrey Clark notes 
that eighteenth-century shipping insurers prudently considered different risks - season, likelihood of 
war, natural hazards, or piracy - but did not compile this information, or use it to generate a 
statistically-informed calculation of risk. In fact, he suggests that they could not see the actuarial 
wood for the trees: “their attention to the particular risks connected to each sailing actually led them 
away from a statistical approach to their underwriting.” In a sentence that also rings true for later 
special cases in insurance risk pricing, he concludes: “Experience counted; counting didn’t.”3 
 
This paper takes up this argument to consider the history of British insurance in terms of its 
engagement with meteorology (hail) and climatology (travel and ‘foreign residence’) between 1830 
and 1914. The former case represented a small but significant part of agricultural insurance while the 
latter was an important aspect of what became a major industry. We suggest that this engagement 
was productive, but fell short of a genuinely scientific or actuarial sense of either meteorology or 
climatology. The reasons for this will be explored later. 
 
Both forms of insurance expanded during the nineteenth century, a period when concomitantly 
meteorology experienced a rapid development of scientific interest and increasing governmental 
relevance especially as regards weather forecasting. Enabled by the telegraph and central organizing 
offices, meteorological statistics could be used to develop conceptual explanations regarding storm 
tracks and weather patterns, which enabled a ‘modern’ vision of meteorology to emerge. As 
Katherine Anderson notes, meteorology was not just a modern enterprise in the sense of using 
technologies like telegraphs, it also promoted a new scale of science that demanded some form of 
central ordering point.4 The prediction of storm paths, for example, required carefully observing and 
assimilating data over a period of time along the track of the storm, a key criterion for the value of a 
Meteorological Office. In climatology, though often sidelined as less scientific,5 statistics enabled 
general understanding of the connections between climate and people, with for example research on 
climate on travel and mortality supported through, for example, the establishment of the General 
Register Office in 1838, which gathered statistics on mortality and on the side collated weather 
information. Indeed the importance of collation of statistics is not underestimated by Nathaniel 
Beardmore as the scientific task of the British Meteorological Society of which he was president 
                                            
2 Timothy Alborn, Regulated Lives: Life Assurance and British Society, 1800-1914 (University of Toronto Press, 2009) and 
Theodore M Porter, (1995) Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton NJ, 1995). 
3 Clark, Betting, 7. 
4 Katherine Anderson, Predicting the Weather: Victorians and the Science of Meteorology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2005). 
5 John Laughton makes this point in his presidential address to the Royal Meteorological Society in 1884 when describing 
his focus on climatology as more akin to geography than meteorology. John K Laughton, “An Address Delivered at the 
Annual General Meeting, January 16th, 1884),” Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 10 (1884): 77-87. 
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1861-62: “We must observe, record and collate, if we would arrive at first causes”.6 Much of the 
historical literature has thus explored the scientific collation of meteorological statistics to explain 
weather phenomena.7 
 
In this paper, however, we show how other statistics were collated for different purposes, producing 
a form of ‘invisible’ weather knowledge, that is, invisible from standard scientific circles or only 
occasionally exchanged with these societies. Statistics were collated by insurance companies to set 
premiums on insurance contracts rather than to explain first causes. Indeed there is one notable 
recorded exception of the way in which an insurance contract came to explore first causes. As James 
Fleming notes, the storm controversy in the 1830s was translated through the French Academy’s 
distinction of electrical storms from tornadoes in the case of an insurance claim made in Paris.8 
Distinguishing, conceptually and empirically, the difference between heat and electricity in the 
causation of tornados was the subject of much scientific debate most clearly evidenced in Dr Hare’s 
1852 pamphlet on the controversy. The insurance companies, however, had already paid out under 
the electrical definition of a tornado’s action. Any alterations to the status of a tornado could re-open 
questions of what payments should have been made or could be made under future contracts.9 
 
Much of the time, we argue that insurers did create some kinds of experiential, insurantial expertise 
about weather and climate risks, but this was rarely formulated within formal meteorological 
scientific circles or even as a fully actuarial science. Nevertheless we believe that it is important 
within histories of the atmospheric sciences to capture expertise beyond the formally recognized 
meteorological sciences. For example, studies of amateur meteorology have suggested that the 
amateur societies and enthusiasts were key to the shaping of professional and scientific endeavour 
through their careful and persistent observing.10 These amateur interests also generated popular 
support for the production of meteorological science as each could be of value in the cause of 
enabling better understanding of weather and consequently one hoped reduce the risks of weather 
hazards. Tabulation was increasingly favoured over the meteoric tradition and this required a 
standardisation of measurements.11 “Amateurs took a leading role in the collection of data, while 
their interpretation remained the domain of the professional.”12 Amateurs were driven therefore by 
ideals of self-improvement and public utility, and created localized forms of weather expertise that 
even if they lacked conceptual apparatus provided robust locally specific and relevant understandings 
of weather. Likewise as Sarah Dry has suggested, the barometers sent to fisherfolk by the 
Meteorological Department in the mid-19th century acted both to prove the necessity of careful 
measurement if one wanted to attain predictive knowledge and at the same time ensure fisherfolk’s 
tacit knowledge to read the weather was enhanced, enabling an effective self-governance rather than 
                                            
6 Nathaniel Beardmore, “Presidential Address,” Proceedings of the British Meteorological Society 1(1861): 1-8, 2. 
7 Anderson, Predicting. James Rodger Fleming, Meteorology in America, 1800-1870 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1991). 
8 Fleming, Meteorology in America, 23-54. 
9 Dr Hare. On the conclusion arrived at by a committee of the Academy of Sciences of France, agreeably to which, tornados are caused by 
heat; while, agreeably to Peltier’s report to the same body, certain insurers had been obliged to pay for a tornado as an electrical storm. Also, 
abstracts from Peltier’s report. 2nd ed. Philadelphia: 1852. 
10 Georgina H. Endfield and Carol Morris, “Exploring the role of the amateur in the production and circulation of 
meteorological knowledge,” Climatic Change 113 (2012): 69-89. 
11 Vladimir Jankovic, Reading the Skies: A cultural history of English weather, 1650-1820 (Manchester: University of Manchester 
Press, 2001). Simon Naylor, Regionalizing Science: Placing Knowledge in Victorian England (London: Pickering and Chatto, 
2010). Anderson, Predicting. 
12 Endfield and Norris, “Exploring”, 72. 
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responsibilizing government for forecast accuracy i.e. the barometer quantified but that 
quantification did not have a unitary goal to achieve better official scientific expertise.13 
 
In our case, companies collected vast reams of data about patterns of hail damage to crops and 
understanding of damages caused by different atmospheric phenomena, which all drew on extended 
knowledge and understanding of farming and agriculture. Indeed, the directors of the hail company 
we will be turning to in a moment were frequently members of agricultural societies. As such insurers 
collated their own ‘invisible meteorological dataset’, in the sense that this was a commercial dataset 
rather than a publicly available one, it was not really used or developed for science, but it 
nevertheless represented a form of meteorologically-related data from which expertise about weather 
risk could be derived. As Eleonora Rohland highlights in the case of Swiss Re, climatic conditions 
and their relevance for fire were regularly considered at board meetings not least because weather 
anomalies had an evident consequence on the financial performance of the company (even if fire was 
not treated as a natural hazard).14 Interestingly Rohland suggests that Swiss Re’s interpretation of 
weather charts somewhat matched meteorological conditions, but were clearly translated through 
other issues such as explanation of major losses to the board. We turn first to the case of hail 
insurance and meteorology, before a more extended consideration of climatology and life insurance 
for people travelling overseas. 
 
 
2. Hail insurance in the UK 
 
Hailstorms, along with floods and droughts, high winds and frost, represent a considerable threat to 
the agricultural economy. Prior to the enclosure movement that largely occurred in England after 
1700, dispersed, scattered and public fields meant that risks from hail were spread and limited in their 
scope on any individual farmer.15 Enclosed fields on the other hand concentrated the risks that a 
hailstorm would have a significant effect on an individual farmer, thus encouraging the development 
of other forms of risk management, whether collective or private. It is within this context that hail 
insurance emerged in the UK in 1840 under the direction of the Farmers and General Insurance 
Company. The directors for this company drew from continental experience in establishing rates and 
procedures; French hail insurance had been discussed since the 1810s and was active since the 1820s, 
and in Italy in 1830 Saverio Capris di Cigliero published his proposal to insure crops against bad 
weather, particularly hail.16 Farmers and General considered the business novel and hived it off into 
a separate entity initially, before re-incorporating it into the main business at the start of 1844. The 
return seems to have been accompanied by a desire for the Farmers and General to retain its 
                                            
13 Sarah Dry, Fisherman and Forecasts: How Barometers Helped Make the Meteorological Department Safer in Victorian Britain. 
Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation Discussion Paper No 46 (London: LSE, 2007). We use the word 
‘responsibilizing’ in the sense in which theorists of governmentality use it, for example in describing “budgets, audits, 
standards, benchmarks,and other technologies that were both autonomizing and responsibilizing”, Nikolas Rose, Pat 
O’Malley,and Mariana Valverde, “Governmentality”, Annual Reviewof Law and Social Science2 (2006) 83–104, 91. 
14 Eleonora Rohland, Sharing the Risk: Fire, Climate and Disaster: Swiss Re 1864-1906 (Lancaster: Crucible Books, 2011). 
15 Donald M. McCloskey, “The open fields of England: rent, risk, and the rate of interest, 1300-1815,” In: David W. 
Galenson (ed) Markets in History: Economic Studies of the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 5-51. 
16 Alan R.H. Baker, “Hail as hazard: changing attitudes to crop protection against hail damage in France, 1815-1914,” 
Agricultural History Review 60 (2013):19-36. Capris di Cigliero, Saverio, Saggio sullo Stabilimento d’una Cassa d’Assicurazione 
Mutua contro danni cagionati dalla Grandine. Torino: salla Tipografia di Domenico Pane, 1830. David R. Stead, “Risk and 
risk management in English agriculture, c.1750-1850,” Economic History Review LVII (2004): 334-361. Franz 
Mauelshagen, “Sharing the risk of hail: insurance, reinsurance and the variability of hailstorms in Switzerland, 1880-
1932,” Environment and History 17 (2011): 171-191. 
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leadership in the field in the face of potential new competitors and potentially to cover the large 
losses suffered in 1843. It is worth noting that Farmers and General were a farming-oriented 
insurance company with policies particularly on life and fire, though also more specific areas like 
farming stock, a coverage that would lead to contracts being agreed for horses travelling overseas 
through to animals struck dead by lightning. Hail insurance, however, (at least for the first three 
decades) turned out to be a profitable business with better rates of return than fire and life, despite 
the relatively small size of the industry. For the Farmers and General, however, there was a clear 
geography of profitability from the hail business. This is both because the company attracted a large 
value in premiums in places like Cambridgeshire, Hampshire and Oxfordshire, but also because loss 
rates varied widely with regular but smaller magnitude losses in counties like Hertfordshire compared 
to more significant losses in places like Huntingdonshire.17 The hail insurance business relied on the 
fact that hail was geographically specific and not a correlated risk in the way that for example disease 
that spread between cattle wiped out some livestock insurance businesses.18 
 
Hail insurance was transacted through company agents located through the agricultural regions of 
England and Wales. Engaging and retaining high quality agents was of considerable concern for the 
business for their ability to attract business, ascertain and determine the reliability of claims 
(sometimes with the direct aid of the Directors of the company), and for prudent financial 
management. When formulating hail policies in the 1840s, there were considerable debates about the 
rates to apply and how to apply them. Should insurance premiums be charged per acre or by the 
value of crop, for example, and while initial experiments with crop value were used, by 1843 acreage 
rates became the norm. For example, the board meeting of the 17th February 1844 agreed a hail 
prospectus for the upcoming season in which hail rates were fixed at 6d per acre for wheat, barley 
and peas, and 4d per acre for oats, beans, turnips and potatoes.19 Extra rates applied if the amount of 
produce per acre exceeded a particular amount, as payout was attached to the losses suffered and the 
more intensively the area was farmed, the greater the potential loss. Three main competitors emerged 
to the company (the General, County and Midland offices) after 1845, but agreed rates for crops 
between offices were normal at least until the mid-1860s. White straw crops, peas and beans were 
thus deemed to be universally vulnerable to hail across England and Wales, and companies competed 
to attract business through other means like agent networks and promotion of their companies 
financial security vis-a-vis their competitors.  
 
The nature of this company should not mislead us into thinking of its directors as conservative 
bumpkins. William Shaw, one of the founders and the Managing Director of the company, was also 
the founder and editor of the most scientific agricultural journal of the day, the Mark Lane Express 
and Agricultural Journal, also editing the Farmer’s Magazine; he and another founder director, Cuthbert 
Johnson, translated and published Von Thaer’s influential Principles of Agriculture, posting a copy – 
along with the company’s hail insurance prospectus - to every farmers’ club in the country.20 As a 
founder of the English (later the Royal) Agricultural Society and supporter of local farming societies, 
                                            
17 This is based on a dataset created by the authors from the annual accounts of the hail business produced by the 
Farmers and General company from 1849-1901. This shows the profits and losses per county per year, which enables 
the construction of maps of hail contracts and payouts, a subject for a future publication. 
18 COCKERELL, H. A. L. and GREEN, Edwin. 1994. The British Insurance Business. Sheffield Academic Press, and 
Walford, Cornelius, Insurance Cyclopedia (1871) Vol. 1 Charles and Edward Layton, London and J H and C M Goodsell, 
New York, 468-473. 
19 Farmers and General Minute Book 4, 1844. 
20 Ernest Clarke, ‘Shaw, William (1797–1853)’, rev. Nicholas Goddard, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/25272, accessed 3 Feb 2014] 
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Shaw played an important role in improving the nature and reputation of agricultural science, and 
10% of the first profits declared by the Farmers and General were devoted to forming Farmer’s 
clubs and awarding prizes “for the encouragement of deserving agricultural labourers”.21 The 
company could also call upon great reserves of veterinary skill both within and beyond the 
boardroom; their Truro agent in 1844 was the famous veterinarian William Karkeek, for example.22 It 
is clear that Shaw and his co-Directors were at the centre of a network of agricultural expertise of 
national and indeed international extent. 
 
However, when we consider hail insurance in terms of meteorology, two things are striking. First, the 
lack of engagement between insurers and meteorologists in the period. Second, despite this, the 
insurers and agents practiced a form of meteorological expertise in both testing claims by looking at 
damaged crops and through identification of potentially risky areas (though they reserved judgment 
on whether that risk was meteorological or not).  
 
First, we have found no evidence that hail insurers sought any kind of meteorological expertise to 
enable them to statistically identify areas of greater or lesser risk, or equally turn the insurance 
datasets into such data for meteorological enquiry. Partly this may be attributed to a turn towards 
more dynamical modes of meteorological reason - in search of physical explanations of e.g. storm 
pathways - rather than statistical ones. That said, severe thunderstorms and hail events attracted the 
attention of members of the Meteorological Society of London (1823-1843) in the early years of the 
hail business, not least exemplified by J. Maverley’s paper read on July 16th 1841 detailing a 
thunderstorm on May 27th that year that had seen five cows killed by lightning and caused thousands 
of pounds worth of damage to glass because of hail.23 The use of statistics was, however, visible in 
related fields, as we will see when we turn to climatology in a moment, even if it did not rely on 
probabilistic forms of calculation. So while hail insurers created what we might term an ‘invisible 
meteorology’, a meteorology that is translated through and represented by insurance statistics, it 
remained detached from scientific considerations of weather and climate. While we don’t wish to 
labour the point here, we suggest that there are many such ‘invisible meteorologies’, not least in 
amateur collections, and shipping that were their own ways of constructing knowledge about 
meteorology which may have not have had scientific approval or legitimation, but were other ways of 
identifying, considering and managing atmospheric risks.24 
 
Hail insurance was an intensely geographical business based on types of agriculture and weather 
patterns. Insurers created a statistical expertise about hail distinctive from the meteorological 
networks emerging from the 1820s and most especially the 1850s onwards.25 For example, this close 
attention to potential climatological risks in a particular part of England was noted in debates about 
the prices of crops in Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire. Several companies – Royal Farmers and 
their main competitors the County Hail-storm Insurance Company (Hertford), General Hailstorm 
Assurance Society (Norwich) and the Midland Counties Insurance Company (Lincoln) –reported 
major losses from hail damage in these area in the 1860s, and shared information in an attempt to 
                                            
21 Prospectus, in ‘Volume of prospectuses of Assurance Societies sent by the Clerical, Medical and General Life 
Assurance Society R826-G’, 1834-1851, IOA. 
22 Linda Warden, ‘Karkeek, William Floyd (1802–1858)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 
2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/15184, accessed 12 Nov 2013] 
23 George J. Symons, “The History of English Meteorological Societies, 1823 to 1880,” Quarterly Journal of the Meteorological 
Society 7 (1881): 65-99, 83. 
24 Endfield and Morris, “Exploring the role of the amateur” 
25 Anderson, Predicting. 
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better understand the risk so that it could be priced more carefully, even exploring the utility of re-
insuring each other.26 From 1866 onwards the Farmers and General directed most of their attention 
to the area around the small town of Somersham in Huntingdonshire, close to the border with 
Cambridgeshire. John Reddish, secretary of the Farmers and General, analyzed the data of losses 
within and outside a radius of 12 miles of Somersham station, arguing that risks were considerably 
greater within the radius than outside it. Using loss figures much as life insurers would use mortality 
statistics, Reddish found that in Huntingdonshire the company lost £818 outside the radius but lost 
£1125 pounds within 12 miles of Somersham; Cambridgeshire policies outside Somersham made a 
profit of just over £855, but lost £93 within the 12 mile radius. Somersham was a very risky place to 
be a hail insurer.27 
 
The question is: was this because Somersham was climatically dangerous or because the crops there 
were unusually exposed or valuable? There is limited evidence of a search for explanations (climatic 
or agricultural) for this pattern, but Reddish gathered evidence in an attempt to delineate 
economically productive climates from economically destructive ones, without causally explaining 
the reasons why. Furthermore, while Reddish did not seek a meteorological explanation and while 
his analysis of the figures was not, properly speaking, actuarial, it focused on the profitability of the 
business in other areas compared to Somersham. In 1873, for example, he noted, “The Somersham 
district was again unprofitable.”28 Other firms also sought further information; in 1870 the General 
Office insisted that new policies within 12 miles of Somersham must furnish information on how 
long the land had been farmed by the applicant, whether it had ever sustained hail damage, when this 
had occurred, if this loss had been compensated, and by whom.29 The effort to review the accounts 
of offices covering Somersham and the changes in pricing to deal with risk both affirm that the 
company did not simply perceive this to be bad luck, but rather was a risk that needed to be 
effectively priced and managed. Again we see evidence being used to inform an expertise about hail 
risk, but not in the scientific way associated with the ‘probabilistic revolution’. 
 
Firms were also concerned to verify claims, looking for signs that damaged crops had really suffered 
from hail; they were similarly careful when checking claims for livestock killed by lighting. There is 
rarely much discussion of the agents’ investigations in the minute books of the Royal Farmers office, 
but the fact that some claims were refused when the damage was suspected to be caused by wind 
suggests that agents had a good sense of what hail damage looked like. In the September of 1851, the 
company refused to pay a claim submitted through the Rotherham agent, “the damage not having 
been caused by hail”, though more than a dozen other claims were paid across the country during 
that month and an additional £15 7/6 was paid to the hail surveyors for assessing these damages.30 
There are similar examples with veterinarians within the company examining the health of horses 
before they were insured for transportation overseas, for example before agreeing to insure the life 
of a horse travelling to Sydney in 1841, and in examining the causes of death of livestock by 
lightning; in 1870 the company refused to pay out on a horse said to have been struck by lightning 
when it was “found to have been killed by injury alleged to have been caused by fear occasioned by 
the storm.”31 Likewise, the vulnerability of different crops to hail was carefully considered and at 
various moments, particular crops grabbed the actuaries’ attention; the market value of each crop 
                                            
26 Royal Farmers and General Minute Book 15b, 1862. 
27 Royal Farmers and General Board Meeting Reports, 1866. 
28 Royal Farmers and General Board Meeting Reports, 1873. 
29 Royal Farmers and General Board Meeting Reports, 1871. 
30 Royal Farmers and General Minute Book 12, 1850-1. 
31 Royal Farmers and General Minute Book 2, 1841-42; Royal Farmers and General Minute Book 17, 1869-74. 
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had to be set against its particular susceptibility to hailstones. John Reddish’s notebook contains 
notes on the nature of kohlrabi, for example, followed by the injunction to “see enquiry form 
attached to Ansley’s Hail proposal 1864 St Ives”, suggesting that he had felt the need to consider 
whether this unusual crop needed a different premium.32 When an agent in Cambridgeshire received 
a proposal to insure kohlrabi in 1870, he wrote to advise Reddish that “I have spoken to two 
experienced seed growers today. They both say that Kohl Rabi seed is not quite so easily shelled as 
Sweed[sic] Turnip Seed, but I think the greater value of Kohl Rabi Seed (the present price being 4/- 
per lb) that 15/- per acre is not too high a premium.”33 This practical expertise – of recognizing and 
recording the effects of hail – also represents a particular kind of meteorological knowledge, but one 
removed from Victorian meteorological scientific circles. 
 
While we have yet to find any maps of hail risk in the records of these companies (not surprising in 
the earlier years given that the first map of English rainfall is claimed to date to 1840),34 an 
agricultural map of risk could be produced that would highlight areas of heightened risk of claims 
and areas of particularly vulnerable crops. Insurers had an understanding of hail damage and areas of 
greater risk, but they did little to try to predict areas of greater hail storms. This makes hail insurance 
records rather less than satisfactory proxies for meteorological records. Indeed, in a brief comparison 
of our dataset from Royal Farmers and General with records of the most severe hailstorms in the 
UK, apart from the 1843 event, there is only limited correlation between those recorded hailstorms 
and hail claims.35 This could be a facet of just this one company’s exposure, but we’re inclined to 
think that hail insurance claims are affected by too many geographically specific factors (crop types, 
densities, farmers social standing, agent networks etc.) to be a reliable, stand-alone environmental 
history dataset. Thus, we suggest hail insurers practiced a kind of ‘invisible meteorological expertise’ 
that showed some understanding of hail and its impact, plus its geographical nature. However this 
was not translated into an actuarial understanding of those areas where claims were greatest, and 
there was no attempt to examine the meteorological causes of hail exposure.  
 
3. Climate, insurance and mortality statistics 
 
Another important connection between insurance and atmospheric science is that of life insurance 
for people travelling or living overseas which drew on and created evidence about relationships 
between climate and health. Here we illustrate how climate and health were conceived of through 
different forms of quantitative analysis and the way these were then taken up by insurance 
companies (there is not space in this article to explore all the various debates about climatic 
determinism and theories of climate and health more broadly).  
 
For insurers, the important point about climate and health was to determine the effects of climate on 
mortality and the causes of disease. One form of analysis was to draw on Cartesian geographical 
understandings of climate, based on a latitudinal approach in which climates at certain latitudes 
proved more dangerous than at others.36 This approach however was challenged from both 
                                            
32 John Reddish's notebook 213a,  
33 Ibid., 227. 
34 Symons, “The History of English Meteorological Societies”, 81. 
35 Data taken from the Tornado and Storm Research Organisation (TORRO) list of major hailstones, which is based on 
J.D.C. Webb, D.M. Elsom and G.T. Meaden, “Severe hailstorms in Britain and Ireland, a climatological survey and 
hazard assessment,” Atmospheric Research 93 (2009): 587-606. This is compared with the data we collated from the Royal 
Farmers and General company (see note 17). 
36 Georgina Endfield and Samuel Randalls, “Climate and empire”  
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climatological (especially the suggestion that isothermal maps might be more relevant) and medical 
(especially acclimatization) angles. A detailed statistical approach was required to disentangle climate 
and mortality statistics. As far back as 1750, Thomas Short had displayed a considerable statistical 
expertise on weather and mortality, concluding for example that on days where there was any type of 
precipitation, rainy days were most injurious to health, while misty or showery days were least 
injurious, and that “an atmosphere loaded with moisture, is unhealthy as it relaxes the body, 
diminishes perspiration and adds to the fluids” especially when mixed with “exhalations from dead 
or living animals or their excrements.”37 But it is in the 19th century that this reasoning comes to its 
epiphany. In 1835 Adolphe Quetelet, the great Belgian statistician whose work was so fundamental 
for actuarial statistics, bemoaned the lack of comparative reliable data which could have been 
compared to different mortality rates: 
 
climatology, taking the word in its most extended sense, is a science still too little advanced to 
engage our attention here: we absolutely want data, and particularly comparative data, with 
respect to countries out of Europe and even some European countries themselves, where 
political sciences have not been sufficiently cultivated.38 
 
So while it was clear that mortality was greater in the South of Europe rather than the North or 
Centre, Quetelet could not say if this was due to natural climate or to political and economic 
differences.39 
 
However information was already being collected, and much of the early work on this relationship 
came from the development of ‘vital statistics’ as a governmental tool. British Parliamentary Reports 
on mortality amongst British troops in the colonies, prompted in the first instance by the 1835 
Medical Board set up to investigate insanitary conditions in Bahamas, are an excellent example. 
Henry Marshall, Deputy Inspector-General of Army Hospitals and Alexander Murray Tulloch were 
both involved in these enquiries into the health of the troops, and Tulloch paid due attention to 
climate and acclimatization in his first report. While European mortality rates were very high in these 
latitudes, particularly deaths from fevers, Tulloch’s analysis of the evidence from different Caribbean 
stations suggested that neither high temperatures nor excess moisture were very important causes of 
fever, though perhaps the two together might be.40 So while Antigua and Barbadoes[sic] had higher 
temperatures than Dominica, Tobago, Jamaica, or the Bahamas, army sickness and mortality rates 
were three times as bad in the second set of stations.41 Tulloch’s next reports on the health of troops 
in Britain, the Mediterranean, and British North America rejected arguments about the origin of 
fevers in marshy soil and excessive vegetation, and his West Africa report reiterated this even more 
forcefully.42 In this way simple relationships between latitude, temperature, humidity and mortality 
were thrown into question; comparative studies of mortality were developing knowledge of the 
relations between disease and climate. Tulloch showed a strong grasp of statistics and his work was 
                                            
37 Short, Thomas, New observations, natural, moral, civil, political and medical, on city, town and country bills of mortality. To which are 
added, large and clear abstracts of the best authors who have wrote on that subject with an appendix on the weather and meteors. London: 
1750, 66. 
38 Quetelet, M A (1842, orig. 1835), A Treatise on Man and the Development of his Faculties. Edinburgh: William and Robert 
Chambers, 26. 
39 Ibid., 26-7. 
40 Statistical Report on the Sickness, Mortality, and Invaliding among the Troops in the West Indies, GBPP 1837-8 XL. See Cullen, 
Michael J., The Statistical Movement in Early Victorian Britain, Barnes and Noble, 1975, 49. 
41 GBPP 1837-8 XL, 101-02. 
42 GBPP 1839 XVI; GBPP 1840 XXX. 
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well received; the Statistical Society of London used it as a model for their study of the East Indies, 
produced by Colonel William Henry Sykes. 
 
By the 1860s other connections between life assurance, medicine and meteorology or climatology 
had emerged. Robert Scoresby-Jackson’s On the influence of weather upon disease and mortality, published in 
1863, developed insights into the use of mortality figures to calculate the healthiness or otherwise of 
different places, but it is worth noting that he had been taught by Robert Christison, an Edinburgh 
professor of medicine who commanded great respect in the life assurance industry, and Scoresby-
Jackson’s Medical Climatology is dedicated to Alexander Keith Johnston, his wife’s uncle and Professor 
of Physical Geography at Edinburgh University.43 Robert Dundas Thomson brought together a 
similar set of interests as medical officer for an insurance office, the President of the British 
Meteorological Society in 1863 until his death in 1864, a famous sanitarian and the first President of 
the Metropolitan Association of Medical Officers of Health.44 
 
Likewise Buchan and Mitchell’s paper on ‘the influence of weather on mortality from different 
diseases and at different ages’ published in 1875, used data from 1845-1874 to show that deaths in 
London had a strong seasonal component with deaths from all causes peaking November through 
March, with a smaller peak in the height of summer.45  The data enabled Buchan and Mitchell to 
identify diseases that predominated under different climatic types in London: dry and warm weather 
led to diarrhoea; dry and cold weather aided gout and suicide; while cold and wet weather advantaged 
influenza, heart disease, rheumatism and measles to name just a few.  
 
Relations between seasonality, climate and health are evident in the work of John Tripe (Medical 
Officer of Health for Hackney and President of the Royal Meteorological Society 1871-73), who had 
previously produced a report on the medical meteorology of London in 1862 and who compiled and 
published a report of the health capabilities of seaside resorts in 1878 that showed the connections 
between climate and health in terms of the health-giving properties of certain climates in winter 
time.46 Indeed it is clear in the comments following the latter paper, that other meteorological society 
members were also doctors, not least Theodore Williams (President of the Royal Meteorological 
Society in 1892-93 and 1900) who commented that he and his father evaluated the climatic data of 
places before sending patients to them.47 Seasonality is also visible in some of the tables and graphs 
produced by A H Smee, the medical officer of the Gresham and other insurance companies. Weekly 
deaths from Bubonic plague at Bombay were at their height in February and March for five 
successive years during the 1896-1901 epidemic, leading Smee to suggest that rainfall might control 
the spread of disease.48 
 
                                            
43 Scoresby-Jackson, Robert E, On the influence of weather upon disease and mortality, (Edinburgh, Neill and Company, 1863). 
Elizabeth Baigent, ‘Jackson, Robert Edmund Scoresby- (bap. 1833, d.1867)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2006 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/14548, accessed 12 
July 2013] 
44 W. W. Webb, ‘Thomson, Robert Dundas (1810–1864)’, rev. Richard Hankins, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/27322, accessed 17 Nov 2009]. 
45 Alexander Buchan and Arthur Mitchell, “On the influence of weather on mortality from different diseases and at 
different ages,” Scottish Meteorological Society 4 (1875): 187-265. 
46 John W. Tripe, “On the Winter Climate of some English Sea-side Health Resorts,” Quarterly Journal of the Royal 
Meteorological Society 4 (1878): 111-135. 
47 Ibid., 129. 
48 A H Smee, Tables and Diagrams illustrating the comparative death rates from various causes and in various occupations. Rixon & 
Arnold, London, 1901, 52-55. Walford, Cyclopedia, (1871), Vol 1, p589. 
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Theories of disease were being transformed in the nineteenth century, however, as environmentally 
determined theories (like Buchan and Mitchell’s) were supplemented with and later largely replaced 
with germ theories. For example, for the tropical colonies germ theories altered the way authorities 
governed the risks of residing in new climates. The risks for the European body in hot climates was 
increasingly moving away from a fear of climatic vulnerability to an understanding that through self-
governance, the European could keep themselves safe. This is a feature of some life insurance notes 
e.g. that a prudent traveller would know to avoid New Orleans during the height of the summer. 
Prudent behaviour - moral, social, alcoholic - would be of as much relevance as the climate.  
 
 
4. Climate Risk in Life Insurance 
 
British life assurance was well established by the later decades of the nineteenth century with 
Timothy Alborn estimating that 30 per cent of the British population – usually men - had life 
insurance policies of some kind by 1890.49 In 1859 more than half of the world’s life insurance 
companies were British, and these offices held 59% of all policies across the world.50 However the 
industry also grew rapidly in the US after the Civil War and again during the Gilded Age, and offices 
also prospered in British colonies towards the end of the century.51 
 
British life assurance firms had long worried about their policyholders travelling overseas, and had 
charged higher premiums to cover the extra risk, just as they dealt with other risks like poor health or 
dangerous occupations. The Farmers and General company agreed that extra payment would be only 
required if policyholders travelled beyond the UK or continental Europe between St Petersburg and 
Gibraltar.52 Policies were void if policyholders did not secure the permission of the firm before 
travelling. However while the principle of charging an addition for overseas risk was straightforward 
enough, calculating this extra rate was not, and this became a pressing issue as colonial and business 
travel grew and life insurance became affordable to a growing middle-class market. Alborn notes that 
the conservative rates charged in the 1840s gave way to more relaxed prices and conditions in later 
decades. The rate charged for a return trip from Dover to Paris via Calais in 1821 would cover a 
four-month trip in the Zambesi District in 1900, for example.53 But this was not an industry-wide 
response to new evidence; “a pioneering company would offer bold reductions in foreign premiums 
based on sketchy data and dare its competitors to follow suit”.54 Sharon Ann Murphy notes that US 
firms also relied on educated guesses, while collecting any information that seemed helpful, and 
became increasingly confident that their own records could inform careful estimates of risk.55 So 
while firms may have had trouble finding enough mortality data to be able to make confident 
predictions of risk, it did not stop them setting rates, or gathering other kinds of data. 
 
There was clearly an institutional demand for information on climate. Many of the works reviewed in 
the preceding section can be found in the library of The Institute of Actuaries, the English insurance 
industry’s centre of calculation from 1848 onwards, though it is not easy to establish when these 
                                            
49 Ibid., 20. 
50 Ibid., 51. 
51 Murphy, Sharon Ann, Investing in Life: Insurance in Antebellum America (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 2010). 
52 Board Meeting, 26th Mar 1840, Royal Farmers Minute Book No. 1. 
53 Bailey, Arthur H. ‘On the rates of extra premium for foreign travelling and residence’, Journal Of The Institute Of 
Actuaries 15 (1869-1870), 77-94, 78; Board Meeting, 11th May 1899, Sceptre Life Association Minute Book No. 4. 
54 Alborn, Regulated, 120. 
55 Murphy, Investing, 28. 
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were acquired. Those works used comparative mortality figures, the building blocks of actuarial 
calculation, to assess healthfulness, making them easy to translate into tools for insurance. However 
it seems clear that while firms sought information on climate, their need for useful data was often 
frustrated and climate seems to have been only one of the factors used to quantify the risk of travel 
or ‘foreign residence’. Mortality statistics were therefore the preferred way of calculating local risk, 
even if it meant that the exact causes of these risks remained mysterious.  
 
In 1845 W. T. Thomson, the actuary of Standard Life, concluded that the industry was charging 
excessively high fees for travel and residence.56 Thomson and his colleagues, including Henry 
Marshall, Deputy Inspector-General of Army Hospitals, consulted different kinds of evidence to find 
a more accurate basis for these extra premiums, including the Parliamentary Reports on mortality 
amongst British troops in the colonies discussed above.57 Marshall had in fact assisted Tulloch with 
his first report on army mortality before being posted overseas. As one nineteenth-century historian 
of insurance noted, “[Thomson’s] report embraced not merely statistical facts and figures, but the 
opinion of the most eminent medical men those countries was sought and obtained.”58 Once this 
information had been collated and new actuarial tables produced, Colonial Standard, a subsidiary of 
Standard Life, was established in 1846. The new company hoped that its cheaper rates would give it 
an advantage over more conservative offices. Risks were divided into four regions, defined in terms 
of broad geographical areas, latitude and season: 
 
“Class A: Europe; North America north of the 38° latitude but not west of the Mississippi; the 
Cape Colony south of the 30° latitude; Australia and New Zealand south of 30° 
latitude. 
Class B: North America north of the 35° latitude but not to the west of the Mississippi, and 
from November to June to the north of the 30° latitude; Bermuda and South 
America south of the 20° latitude. 
Class C: India, Ceylon, Mauritius and Chinese treaty ports.  
Class D: the West Indies.”59 
 
Other offices quickly adopted similar rates. Eagle Life claimed to have engaged in similar research 
before setting their premiums: “Whenever correct grounds for calculation existed, on them the 
premiums have been founded. In all cases they have been cautiously compared and collated”.60 The 
US life insurance industry, based in North East cities, concurred with the Colonial’s concern over life 
expectancy in the Western and Southern states and charged extra premiums south of the borders of 
Virginia and Kentucky (about 36. 5° latitude).61 
 
Some of the justification for these different zones came from medicine. In the 1860s discussions of 
climate began to appear in handbooks for medical examiners, written to advise ordinary practitioners 
on how to examine applicants for life assurance. It seems likely that these doctors learned a good 
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deal about the risks of overseas climates through guides like this. In this way life assurance helped 
shape medical knowledge and practice in the everyday work of general practitioners across Britain, as 
Alborn has argued it did for understandings of tuberculosis.62 One guide, written by William Brinton, 
Physician at several London hospitals and for the Mutual Life Assurance Society, noted “it is 
convenient to distinguish between the constitutional effects of mere climate, and the risk of diseases 
more or less endemic to the inhabitants of a given locality.”63 The former concerned “certain general 
influences of climate, concerning which we can group our knowledge into something more akin to 
law” – so that denizens of warm climates who moved to Britain risked tuberculosis, but those from 
Southern Europe were less at risk of this as those from Africa or Central Asia.64 In the case of the 
latter the doctor would “judge by the frequency and fatality of the endemic disease, how far it 
damaged the probabilities of life.”65 
 
Another handbook from the 1860s, by Jonathan Adams Allen, Professor at Rush Medical College, 
Chicago, stressed that: “An acquaintance with the meteorological condition of particular localities, is 
of great importance. Excessive thermometrical, barometrical and hygrometrical variations, in any 
particular locality, usually impair risks, by rendering them subject to various diseases.”66 As a result, 
he suggested, “Without exact reference to isothermal lines, natives of the zone extending from the 
thirtieth to the fiftieth parallels of latitude, may be considered as the best risks.”67 Like Brinton, Allen 
also discussed the possibilities and risks of ‘acclimation’ (acclimatisation). This question, which had 
been examined by Tulloch in his pioneering work on army mortality, remained important for medical 
referees into the twentieth century, as it suggested that surviving initial infections as well as adapting 
to temperature and humidity reduced the risks for the transplanted European.  
 
By the 1880s, commentators like Jeremiah Levan were convinced that “In climate we find one of the 
most powerful agencies in producing as well as modifying disease… Certain diseases are engendered 
by the effects of peculiar climates, whilst others, again, are removed and relieved by the same 
agency.”68 He urged the examiner to estabish whether applicants were travelling to ‘torrid’ or 
‘temperate’ climates. By the 1890s medical and actuarial workers were actively sharing information. 
James Edward Pollock and James Chisholm considered adding a section on climate and the diseases 
of South Africa, Canada, Australia and India and other British colonies to the fourth edition of their 
text for medical examiners, following the expansion of insurance in those places – but had 
abandoned it as too big a subject.69 Luckily the colonies were “well supplied with medical men of 
high intelligence, whose reports we are daily receiving, and who are steadily adding to our 
knowledge”.70 Pollock and Chisholm’s confidence suggests that companies felt able to make climate 
a productive source for the calculation of risk. 
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By this point there was a certain amount of agreement between British firms about safe and risky 
latitudes. Between 1882 and 1903 the Prudential, the biggest British firm at the turn of the century, 
produced a map showing the dangerous latitudes as a ‘pink zone’. After a year with the company, 
policyholders could apply to live anywhere outside the pink zone; but five years with the company, 
medical approval and extra premiums were required to live within it, and the Gold Coast and New 
Orleans were still off limits.71 
 
 
(Special Instructions and Tables, Prudential Assurance Company Ltd. February 1884, p143.) 
 
This map suggests a neat system where latitude, climate, and disease were proxies for each other, 
where life assurance translated data between medicine, climate science, and vital statistics. Medical 
men working in tropical epidemiology used company records as evidence, as Robert Christison, 
Colonial Life’s medical officer, did in 1864, and doctors in the tropics updated firms with new 
findings and suggestions.72 However some actuaries were worried about the neatness of these 
boundaries and the character of this system; in 1869 Arthur Bailey, was already describing this 
development of “bounding the prohibited regions” as “convenient but not scientific”, noting that 
firms did not always follow their own rules: “when… the prohibited regions are once touched, all 
system is at an end.”73 
 
It also proved impossible to separate climate from other factors when calculating risk, just as Brinton 
had suggested. So while James Meikle urged actuaries to consider the work of von Humboldt and 
other “writers on tropical climates”, he also discussed the diet and customs of different places, the 
habits of individuals, and the records of existing firms or of state censuses. Much of these last 
matters did not mention climate, or even disease, but dealt in mortality rates alone as a proxy for 
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risk.74 And in 1908 Edward Brockbank stated that the tropics were “dangerous for several reasons, 
the chief of which are the heat, and the endemic diseases, sanitation and food.”75 The discussion of 
acclimation also makes it clear that the nature and habits of the applicant was another key factor, and 
by the early twentieth century the proposer’s ‘race’ was also felt to be increasingly important.76 
 
In conclusion, then, life assurance companies drew on different resources to make climate a useful 
consideration in calculating risk - climatology; the influence of climate on disease and health; and 
mortality records for different localities – though these were not analysed in terms of probability. 
While climatological data were considered – for example in Tulloch’s pioneering work, or in the 
medical examiner’s handbooks – the condition of contemporary medical knowledge made it hard to 
establish relationships between life expectancy and climatic phenomena like temperature or humidity. 
Given the industry’s obsession with mortality rates, it is not surprising that these were often used as 
proxy indicators of healthiness; unpacking these black boxes would have required a good deal of 
work, and in many places neither the data nor the scientific understanding of their relation to the 
problem were available. Creating case-by-case evaluations of these risks was also a major undertaking 
for firms, so it is not surprising that they adopted zones of different premiums; here again latitude 
often stood in for climate data, though it is clear that the zones also reflected Anglo-Saxon prejudices 
as well as geopolitical and other matters. The ease of translation between these terms (climate, 
mortality, latitude, disease, sanitation) was both an advantage and a recurring concern. Perhaps this 
wide-ranging search for ideas with which to inform the calculation of risk reflects the essential 
prudence of the actuarial outlook; it may just have easily have reflected the difficulties involved in 
making this kind of information useful for insurers.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have showed that insurance companies in the nineteenth century collected, collated 
and synthesized data to produce their own forms of experiential expertise of the impact of weather 
and climate on their insurance businesses. In neither hail insurance nor life insurance for travellers 
overseas could insurers be said to be leading scientific debates, but they did create their own form of 
expertise not dissimilar to forms of amateur expertise, though this time for a greater calculative, if 
not actuarial purpose.77 Insurers didn’t count as such in terms of actuarial calculation when it came to 
weather and climate risks, but they did draw on a wide array of statistics and expertise as inputs to 
decision-making about pricing contracts, even if in the end they tended to use existing mortality 
figures as proxies for risk, and their broader experience of risky environments and situations counted 
far more than actuarial expertise did, just as was the case for Geoffrey Clark’s eighteenth-century 
firms. As Arthur Bailey complained in 1869, firm’s rates for travel were “arbitrary and unscientific”, 
though we would disagree with his suggestion that they were “for the most part little better than 
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random guesses made on no intelligible principles.”78 The principles were there; but they were 
neither fully scientific nor actuarial. 
 
As such, one could suggest that insurers became mere users of the science being produced and of 
little interest therefore to historians of these sciences. Nonetheless we argue that historians of the 
atmospheric sciences should be interested in these kinds of expertise for two reasons. First, amateurs 
and other organizations have played important roles not just in collecting data, but also in changing 
the mindset about governance of weather and climate risks. Indeed as Sarah Dry shows the 
emergence of weather forecasts unsettled easy distinctions between individuals’ responsibilities and 
the responsibility of the state to ensure protection against weather risks.79 While meteorological 
statistics brought a form of central organizing power to the Meteorological Department, the local 
fisherfolk were enabled to form their own local expertise that enabled individual responsibility to be 
maintained in the event of failure of the calculative system. The project of meteorology was bound 
up in the social and political context of the time such that other forms of meteorological expertise 
continued to proliferate and even inform the scientific debates. In our case, insurers utilized this 
expertise and combined it with their own historical experience to map out areas of higher climatic 
risk than others even if they were less worried about causality than their business profitability. In the 
case of life insurance, the British companies displayed a particularly imperial approach to pricing risk 
that complemented but was also distinctive from traditional academic concerns of connections 
between climate, race and empire.  
 
Second, it is useful to approach the question of science and society from the other side, in this case 
particular companies figuring out how to deal with weather and climate risks in a practical sense. In 
this paper we explored a somewhat invisible expertise, one that drew in evidence from scientific 
authorities, but which utilized it within the industry without projecting this back out into the 
scientific debates even as it had consequences on people’s lives. For example, a person travelling 
overseas faced the very real additional premiums that an insurance company wished to charge based 
on its understanding of climate and health risks drawn from the company’s own experience and that 
of external advice. The fact that thousands of farmers, travellers, physicians, and insurance agents 
had to engage with this knowledge – consulting prospectuses like the Colonial’s, maps like that 
produced by the Prudential, or handbooks like those of Pollock and Chisholm- suggests that 
insurance may well have popularised these ideas of weather and climate far beyond the places of 
expert knowledge. To understand the social place of meteorological and climatological expertise 
historically, it is useful to trace out the networks, connections and expertise beyond the narrowly-
defined scientific community and to tell historical studies about expertise of the atmosphere from the 
bottom-up. Not least they may surprise us with the extent to which they shape the actually 
experienced relationships and understandings of weather and climate, perhaps even more than those 
of official scientific circles. 
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